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ABSTRACT
The study’s main objective is to question the exclusion of domestic workers from freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights and to propose possible policy solutions to allow the rights to these workers. The paper focuses in 
the Canadian and in the Brazilian cases. Even though the Brazilian and Canadian models illustrate two very different 
approaches towards collective organization, both countries present regulatory challenges to the effective recognition of 
domestic workers’ freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. The policy solutions to these challenges in 
the case of domestic work can serve other groups of vulnerable workers, such as migrants, low wage service workers, 
informal workers. The methodology is developed through bibliographical and documentary analysis.
Keywords: Freedom of association. Collective bargaining. Domestic work. ILO Convention 189. Brazil. Canada.
RESUMO
O principal objetivo do estudo é questionar a exclusão dos trabalhadores domésticos dos direitos de liberdade de 
associação e de negociação coletiva e propor possíveis soluções políticas para permitir esses direitos aos trabalhadores. 
O artigo enfoca os casos canadense e brasileiro. Embora os modelos brasileiro e canadense ilustrem duas abordagens 
muito diferentes para a organização coletiva, ambos os países apresentam desafios regulatórios para o reconhecimento 
efetivo da liberdade sindical e da negociação coletiva dos trabalhadores domésticos. As soluções políticas para esses 
desafios, no caso do trabalho doméstico, podem servir a outros grupos de trabalhadores vulneráveis, como migrantes e 
trabalhadores informais, que são trabalhadores no setor de serviços com baixos salários. A metodologia é desenvolvida 
por meio da análise bibliográfica e documental.
Palavras-chave: Liberdade sindical. Negociação coletiva. Trabalho doméstico. Convenção 189 da OIT. Brasil. Canadá.
1 Introduction1
Domestic workers in most countries have no legal protection to exercise their freedom of association 
and collective bargaining rights (FA/CB). The peculiar characteristics of domestic work do not lend themselves 
to labour regulations based on the conventional employment relationship within industrial workplaces. Even 
though domestic workers have been striving to organize collectively for more than a century, lack of legal 
regulation has hindered these attempts (SHAH; SEVILLE, 2011/2012; MIRANDA, 2007; VAN RAAPHORST, 
1988). However, the number of people working in atypical arrangements has steadily risen in recent years 
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(SMIT; FOURIE, 2010; BLACKETT, 2005; SMITH, 2000). Moreover, both in national contexts and in the 
international order, the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining have been affirmed as 
fundamental rights. It is time to update theoretical frameworks to better fit the new reality. 
This paper aims to develop a critical analysis of the exclusion of domestic workers from coverage 
under labour relations legislation in light of recent recognitions of FA/CB rights as fundamental rights and 
to elaborate on policy solutions for the recognition of these rights.This proposal fills an important gap in our 
knowledge by analyzing viable regulatory regimes for guaranteeing FA/CB rights to domestic workers. The 
study focuses in the Canadian and in the Brazilian cases, but will also analyze some examples from other 
countries that have developed different models for the collective actions of domestic workers. 
The Brazilian and Canadian models illustrate two very different approaches towards collective 
organization. The Brazilian system is characterized as a corporatist model that on one hand guarantees 
strong protection and legal interference concerning trade union creation, and on the other does not promote 
real representativeness. The Canadian system follows the Wagner Act model: on one hand promoting 
the self-organization of workers in the workplace through procedural rules; and on the other, based on 
the representativeness of the trade union. Each model presents characteristics that can fit or not to the 
peculiarities of domestic work. Our goal is to explore the compatibilities and incompatibilities of these 
models with domestic workers’ collective organization and draw from this analysis some policy proposals.
The study addresses two research questions: a. does the exclusion of domestic workers from labour 
relations regulations violate the principle of freedom of association? and b. what policies would be effective 
in guaranteeing FA/CB rights for domestic workers? The first part of the paper will develop a theoretical and 
legal justification for the recognition of FA/CB rights as domestic workers’ fundamental rights. The second 
part will examine the feasibility of a regulatory regime for guaranteeing FA/CB rights to domestic workers, 
taking into account the Canadian and the Brazilian models. 
Previous studies have examined domestic work through various perspectives: labour conditions, 
migration, gender, family, race in Canada (ARAT-KOC, 1989; FUDGE, 2011; HODGE, 2006; ANDERSON, 
2010; MARINCOLA, 2011) and in Brazil (COSTA, 2007; MELO; CONSIDERA; SABBATO, 2016; TELES, 
2014). Some studies, based primarily in the U.S., have focused on freedom of association and collective 
rights of domestic workers (SMITH 2000, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 2010, HAYASHI 
2010, SHAH AND SEVILLE 2011/2012). FA/CB rights have been reaffirmed as fundamental rights in the 
international order by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in three separate promulgations: the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization and the 2011 Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (BLACKETT, 2012; ILO, 
2012; MANTOUVALOU; ALBIN, 2012). In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has expanded 
the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to recognize the freedom to engage 
in collective bargaining as part of the right to freedom of association. In the case of agricultural workers, 
the SCC ruled that the exclusion of agricultural workers from the Ontario Labour Relations Act violated the 
Charter, requiring the government to pass a law that would protect their FA/CB rights (Dunmore Case 2001). 
In Brazil, a constitutional amendment recognized collective bargaining rights to domestic workers in 2013. A 
2016 UN Report on freedom of association explains that “The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights requires that States ensure that people can organize and join workers’ associations 
that address their concerns, and that particular attention be given to domestic workers”. These national and 
international developments have altered the context for considering a system to guarantee FA/CB rights to 
domestic workers. Thus, there is a need to re-visit the issue and to consider anew possible policy solutions. 
The methodology is developed through bibliographical and documentary analysis, constituting 
qualitative study with descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes.
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2  Does the exclusion of domestic workers from labour law regulations violate the 
principle of freedom of association?
Domestic work is considered one of the most precarious form of work. Not only domestic workers 
suffer poor working conditions, receive low wages and are subject to all types of violence and exploitation, 
they also suffer legal precariousness (MANTOUVALOU; ALBIN, 2012), that is, in many jurisdictions domestic 
work is still excluded from employment and labour laws. On the issue of how best to reverse this situation 
of vulnerability, effective solutions are not simply about guaranteeing labour standards (BLACKETT, 2005). 
Since domestic workers miss two key dimensions of labour law: they are not guaranteed fair employment 
conditions and have no effective way to express their autonomy (SIMI, 1967), it is essential to guarantee 
also that these workers are able to express their autonomy. When they have no protection to form and 
join unions and to bargain collectively (ILO, 2000; ILO, 2004b), they are not perceived as workers who are 
capable of collective action to express their interests and regulate their own relations. At the end, when 
domestic workers do not have their FA/CB recognized, all the efforts to guarantee decent work conditions 
are in vain. 
The approval of ILO Convention 189 in 2011 had one important initial effect to the issue of the 
legal protection of FA/CB to domestic workers: it put the lights on the work done by domestic workers’ 
associations, recognized their role and gave them their own space in forums like the International Labour 
Conference. According to the ILO, this process “galvanized the domestic workers’ movement, fostering its 
emergence within trade union organizations or bringing it closer to them” (ILO, 2012, III).
The International Domestic Workers Network (IDWN), established in 2007, lead a campaign 
to the adoption of an international convention on domestic work. The campaign for the adoption of the 
Convention 189 counted with the participation of IDWN, Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and 
Organizing (WIEGO), International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and national associations through 
the organization of workshops, publication of reports on the necessity of a convention, and participation of 
domestic workers organizations2 in the ILO 2009, 2010 and 2011 International Conference (WIEGO, 2016). 
The process of adopting this new convention revealed how essential is the role played by domestic workers’ 
associations in improving the working conditions of these workers. This importance can be seen in concrete 
actions by trade unions in the national spheres.3
The Convention 189 recognizes this importance by guaranteeing to domestic workers their right 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining, explicitly establishing that Members States should 
“protect the right of domestic workers and employers of domestic workers to establish and, subject to the 
rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations, federations and confederations of their own 
choosing” (Article 3, §3). Even before the explicit recognition by the Convention, the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association had already decided that: “Domestic workers are not excluded from the application 
of Convention No. 87 and should therefore be governed by the guarantees it affords and have the right to 
establish and join occupational organizations” (ILO, 2006, §267).
The Committee has decided also that domestic workers’ trade unions have the right to access the 
workplace even if the workplace is a private household, as it is the case of domestic workers (ILO, 2006, 
§1108). The ILO is very explicit in recognizing the legal right to FA/CB to domestic workers (ILO, 2012, 
2).4 Therefore, any regulation that exclude or restrict the freedom of association and the right to collective 
2 In addition to these organizations, as Matilla (2011) explains, the adoption of the Convention “was at least partly a result of the intensive lobbying 
and increasing pressure from organisations such as Migrant Forum Asia, Amnesty International, Anti-Slavery International, and the internationally 
recognized Indian National Domestic Workers Movement”. 
3 In a survey among European trade unions, organizing domestic workers, raising public awareness on their working conditions, collective bargaining, 
lobbying and legal support were cited as the main activities of a trade union in the field of domestic work (CARLS, 2012).
4 Even though, until the adoption of Convention 189 there has been a long period of silence by the ILO about the legal protection of domestic 
workers. See Blackett, 1998.
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bargaining of domestic workers violates the principle of freedom of association and the principle of collective 
bargaining, protected by Conventions 87 and 198, respectively, and recognized by the 1998 ILO Declaration 
as fundamental rights of all workers. 
The United Nations (UN), nonetheless, recognizes that many countries still exclude these workers 
from the right to bargain collectively and are not recognized freedom of association (UNITED NATIONS, 
2016). Domestic workers are being excluded by law or have no ways to effectively exercise these rights.5 In 
both cases, the result is the same: domestic workers are only allowed to associate in women’s, migrant’s, 
community’s associations. Or when they can form a trade union and have right to collective bargaining, still 
have no effective way to negotiate (HOBDEN, 2015). 
The usual main argument used in excluding or restricting these rights for domestic workers is the fact 
that they do not fit in the trade union model build by Labor Law based on a standard employment relationship. 
Domestic workers work isolated in a private home performing a work that still in many countries is not 
considered to have an economic value. This argument disregards the role of law in promoting domestic 
workers’ rights, more specifically FA/CB rights, since it argues that the peculiarities of domestic work, and 
not the absence of legal protection, are the factors that substantially interfere with the right to collective 
bargaining (FARADAY, 2012).
In a larger picture this thinking has two very serious consequences to the regulation of labour. First, 
it restricts the role of Labour Law only to standard work relationships, excluding from its protection non-
standard employment relationships where most of precarious types of work can be found. Second, it 
reveals the incapacity of changing the traditional regulatory models in order to include these non-standard 
employment relationships. In synthesis, the current situation in many countries is that workers who are in so 
much need of Labour Law protection are exactly the ones excluded from it. In the case of domestic workers, 
in addition to the peculiarities of the work, it is a type of work done mostly by women, many of whom are 
migrants, from specific racialized groups, and often with low levels of education (ILO, 2004; EHRENREICH; 
HOCHSCHILD, 2002; ANDERSON, 2000; CHANG, 2001; FOLBRE; NELSON, 2000; MEAGHER, 1997). 
The absence of the law becomes one more element reinforcing the precariousness of this type of work. 
Being an atypical type of work performed by specific groups in society that already are subject of some 
sort of discrimination and ignored by the law has subjected domestic work to exploitation by employers in 
developed and developing countries alike. The recognition of their rights of FA/CB would mean to provide 
domestic workers with an essential instrument (as it has been the case of other workers) to empower these 
workers in the employment relationship. 
When the ILO guarantees the principle of freedom of association through its conventions, 
recommendations and decisions of the Committee of Freedom of Association, it does not impose any 
given system as the only one that would comply with the principle. The specific rules of each legal system 
concerning trade union and collective bargaining should be formulated by each member State according 
to their practices and customs. Thus, there is no “right” model of freedom of association. This loosen 
approach is even more true when it concerns domestic workers. Since, most countries still do not or do 
not fully recognize FA/CB rights to domestic workers, there is still some incertitude on what type of labour 
relations model would fit the peculiarities of domestic work, and most important, would be effective. If we 
look at countries that already have some rules in place, they differ a lot from each other. Considering this, 
we will next examine two different labour relations models, analyze how they comply with Convention 189 
concerning freedom of association and what policies would be need to include domestic workers in their 
protection.
5  As it is the case of Canada and Brazil, specifically.
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3 The brazilian case
Brazil is an important case for the study of regulation of domestic work. Being one of the biggest 
employers of domestic workers among developing countries with 6.2 millions domestic workers (IBGE, 
2016), until 25 years ago, domestic workers had almost no labour rights. In this period of time, the country 
developed one of the most advanced labour rights law for domestic work among ILO members. In 1988, 
the new Federal Constitution guaranteed to domestic workers some of the fundamental labour rights 
guaranteed to all employees.6 In 2006, law #11.324 changed law #5.859 that regulated domestic work since 
1972, expanding labour rights guaranteed to these workers. Law n.11.324 recognized the right to thirty 
days of paid vacation, employment protection for pregnant workers, paid legal holidays, and the prohibition 
of wage discount in case of supply of meals, housing and hygienic products by the employer (BRASIL. 
MTE, 2007, at 6). In 2008, decree #6481 included domestic child labour among the worst forms of child 
labour and prohibited domestic work for workers under the age of eighteen years old. This decree creates 
the Brazilian list of worst forms of child labour in accordance with ILO Convention 182 ratified by Brazil.
In 2013, Constitutional Amendment 72/2013 was approved, recognizing to domestic workers all 
fundamental labour rights guaranteed to a typical employee, such as indemnization in case of dismissal 
without cause, unemployment insurance, extra pay for night-shift work, family bonus, overtime pay, limited 
hours of work, severance pay indemnity fund system (FGTS), and occupational accident insurance. In 
2015, Law #150 regulated the exercise of the new recognized rights, regulating the domestic work contract 
as well asthe payment of social security and tax contributions (COSTA; GOMES, 2016). 
In Brazil, informality has decreased among domestic workers. Between 2001 and 2009, the number 
of formal domestic workers has increased 30% while the number of informal domestic workers increased 
20% (IPEA, 2011). Formalization has continued to increase during the first decade of the 2000s (IPEA, 
2011); however, formal domestic workers still are only 33.2% of all domestic workers in 2016, while 77.3% 
of workers are formal in the private sector (IBGE, 2016).
Looking at a brief profile of domestic workers in Brazil gives us the social and economic significance 
of having this parcel of workers excluded from the formal market. Domestic work is one of the biggest 
professional categories in Brazil (10% of the labour force in the second trimester of 2016) (IBGE, 2016), 
the second most common job for women (92% of domestic workers are women), and one of the main jobs 
for African-Brazilians (62% of domestic workers are African-Brazilians) (IBGE, 2016). In 2009, most of 
them had elementary school level (41.9%) (IBGE, 2010). To effectively guarantee labour rights and social 
security rights to these workers means to reach the poorest groups in society.
In Brazil, domestic workers have guaranteed by the Federal Constitution FA/CB rights. Article 7°, 
sole paragraph, of the Constitution states as a fundamental right of domestic workers the recognition of 
their collective agreements. As a result, domestic workers are included in the country’s corporatist labour 
relations system.7 In 2016, there were 25 domestic workers’ trade unions and 3 employers’ trade unions 
registered at the Ministry of Labour in Brazil. The first domestic workers’ trade union was created in 1936 
in the province of São Paulo – the Santos Professional Association of Domestic Workers. At that time, their 
two main objectives were to be recognized by the State as a trade union and the inclusion of domestic 
workers in the protection of Labour Law (COSTA, 2007). Only, in 1972, one of these goals was achieved. 
The president of the Santos Professional Association of Domestic Workers had a meeting with the ministry 
6  Article 7 of the 1988 Constitution recognized to domestic workers ten of the twenty nine fundamental labour rights: minimum wage; irreducibility 
of wage; annual bonus equal to one month’s salary; paid weekly rest, preferably on Sundays; annual paid vacation (30 days) with remuneration 
at least one third higher than the normal wage; 120 days paid maternity leave; five days paid paternity leave; notice of dismissal; as well as of 
integration in the social security system.
7 For a more detailed analysis of the main characteristics of the Brazilian labour relations system - the professional category, the unicity and the 
mandatory trade union dues – and all the problems generated by this system, see Gomes and Prado (2011).
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of labour at the time to present their demands on the inclusion of domestic work in the labour legislation. 
The answer came with the promulgation of the federal law #5.859 that recognized a few employment rights 
to domestic workers.8
Domestic workers’ trade unions continue to be organized, but not legally registered as trade unions 
and founding little support from the traditional trade union movement. In 1997, the National Federation of 
Domestic Workers was created (Federação Nacional das Trabalhadoras Domésticas – Fenatrad). The 
Fenatrad is also affiliated to the Central Única dos Trabalhadores - CUT. Notwithstanding the affiliation of 
domestic workers’ trade unions to CUT, the trade unions often reported finding more support from the Afro-
Brazilian and feminist movements than from the traditional trade unions.9
Fighting against the lack of legal recognition and little support from other labour groups, domestic 
workers’ trade unions in Brazil were able to have a central role in the movement for the recognition of labour 
rights and in making public cases of labour rights’ violation, sexual harassments and labour accidents. In 
1988, with the promulgation of the new Federal Constitution, the domestic workers’ trade union organized 
in order to have guaranteed some fundamental labour rights to domestic workers. After 1988, there was still 
no consensus in the jurisprudence and in the literature whether the Constitution had recognized freedom of 
association to domestic workers. 
We argue that domestic workers had since the promulgation of the Federal Constitution the right to 
organize in trade unions for two reasons. First, the Constitution guarantees as a fundamental right the right 
to associate (Article 5, Line XVII), second there is no explicit restriction of this right in relation to domestic 
workers by the Constitution. However, the majority of the literature considered that they could not organize 
in trade unions as they did not constitute a professional category and their employers did not constitute an 
economic category (RODRIGUES, 2009). Notwithstanding this understanding, the Ministry of Labour in 
Brazil gradually started to accept the registration of Brazilian domestic workers. The Campinas Domestic 
Workers’ trade union, for example, was officially registered as a trade union in 2008 (BRASIL. MTE, 2008).
Being registered as a trade union, however, did not give them the prerogative to negotiate, since the 
Federal Constitution did not guarantee the right to collective bargaining to domestic workers. A decision of 
the Superior Labour Court confirmed this restriction on domestic workers’ rights: “The Constitution does 
not recognize collective agreements of domestic workers (Article 7, line XXVI), therefore there is a logical 
obstacle to recognize the right of collective bargaining for these workers”.
Only in 2013, the demand of domestic workers’ trade unions for an equalization of labour rights 
between domestic workers and employees entered a new phase after the approval of the Constitutional 
Amendment 72. The constitutional amendment recognizes to domestic workers the fundamental right to 
collective bargaining. This guarantee opened a whole new world of possibilities. There was no legal doubt 
on their right to register their trade unions, nor on their right to collective bargaining. 
An immediate consequence of the constitutional change was an increase in the number of registered 
trade unions and applications for registration. In the context of the Brazilian corporatist system, however, 
this increase does not entirely reflect an effective organization of domestic workers. It is hard to tell how 
many of the new trade unions are representative or are only a result of an opportunist action from some 
group intending to hold the legal representation of domestic workers in a certain municipality. The same is 
valid for domestic workers’ employers’ trade unions. As in Brazil, employer associations are also considered 
trade unions and have the same legal treatment as workers’ trade unions, with the constitutional change, 
domestic workers’ employers’ trade unions will also experience an increase in number. In synthesis, on 
one side, the corporatist system facilitates the creation of domestic workers’ and their employers’ trade 
8 Another important action of the Santos trade union was a campaign against live-in domestic workers. The campaign sought to allow domestic 
workers to live in their own homes, what they argued would be essential to emancipate domestic workers, denying the idea that domestic workers 
are a part of the employers’ families (COSTA, 2007).
9 For example, during the negotiation for the adoption of the1988 Federal Constitution, domestic workers trade unions found in these movements, 
the support that was lacking from traditional trade unions (COSTA, 2007).
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unions; on the other side, the lack of representativeness characterizes the corporatist trade union in other 
categories, might also be a problem among domestic workers. 
One important indicator of the real organization of domestic workers will be the negotiation of 
collective agreements. On this topic, since the constitutional amendment, already one collective agreement 
was negotiated. In 2013, a collective agreement between the Sindicato das Empregadas e Trabalhadores 
Domésticos da Grande São Paulo (SINDOMÉSTICA) and the Sindicato dos Empregadores Domésticos 
do Estado de São Paulo (SEDESP). The agreement deals with wages, payment of wages, vacation, hours 
of work, night shift, travels, room and board, transportation, dismissal, unemployment insurance, maternity 
stability and trade union dues. Mostly the agreement reaffirms what is already established in the Labour 
Code (CLT) and in the Constitution, adding new conditions specially, on minimum wage and compensation 
of hours. Since 2013, the trade unions already negotiated three more agreements in 2014, 2015 and 2016.
The corporatist rules have repercussions not only on trade union creation, but also on the development 
of collective bargaining. According to the law, as the trade unions are registered, they can negotiate. When 
they reach an agreement, this agreement is valid to the entire professional and economic category that is, 
all workers are covered by this agreement and all employers are obliged to it. It is not relevant the affiliation 
to the trade union, nor any type of involvement in the organization of the category. Achieved the agreement, 
workers can complain to the labour courts in case of violation of its clauses. As the registration of a trade 
union in Brazil follows the first-come, first-serve rule, there is a risk of a non-representative trade union 
negotiates an agreement. This problematic situation is not peculiar to domestic workers. It is common to all 
workers in Brazil.
However, in the case of the typical employee this excessive interference of the law might generate 
more dysfunctional consequences than in the case of domestic workers. As the typical employee works in 
a traditional workplace and not isolated from other workers, he/she does not face the same obstacles to 
unionization as domestic workers. In other words, the typical employee is capable and had the right to fully 
exercise its freedom to establish “the organisations of their own choosing” (ILO, Convention 87, Article 2). 
The law should protect the exercise of this freedom, promoting representativeness and preventing unfair 
labour practices. 
In the case of domestic workers, they work in a private household and isolated from other workers. 
These two conditions by themselves already pose strong obstacles to their unionization and collective 
bargain. The fact that they work in a private household make it harder the access of a trade union to the 
domestic worker. Since they work isolated from each other, it is hard to domestic workers to organize a 
reunion. The isolation of domestic workers also compromises an important feature of collective action. 
Among other achievements, the organization in a trade union in a certain degree depersonalizes worker’s 
voice and action. This feature makes it possible for workers to expose and try to resolve workplace’s conflicts 
without being individually exposed to a retaliatory measure from the employer. For domestic workers, it will 
always be personal. The decision to organize a trade union, to affiliate to a trade union, any complain made 
through a trade union. In consequence of all this, it is much harder for domestic workers to organizing a 
trade union than to a typical worker. 
The Brazilian corporatist system imposes a model of organization based on the unionization by 
categories, the legal exclusivity of representation of the category and mandatory trade union’s dues. All this, 
at the cost of the low representativeness of trade unions, since membership involvement in the creation 
of the trade union is not necessary. For typical employees, these rules mean a strong restriction in their 
individual freedom to create the organizations according to their convenience. For domestic workers, these 
rules might mean a necessary protection that will allow them to organize in trade unions. The organization 
in categories, the creation of a trade union without membership requirements or a vote, the exclusivity of 
representation for the whole category provide to domestic workers an easier way to organize. The cost of 
low representativeness is still there, but a strong membership might not be an essential feature of this stage 
of domestic workers’ association. 
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4 The canadian case
Like most jurisdictions, Canada does little to protect domestic workers’ rights to freedom of association. 
Although domestic workers are entitled to the same employment standards rights as other workers, these 
rights are poorly enforced. Since the majority of formal domestic workers in Canada are migrants who 
came to the country through the Live-in Caregiver Program (LCP), they are particularly vulnerable due 
to some of the legislated requirements of this program (SPITZER; TORRES, 2008). First, LCP workers 
had to live in their employer’s household and could not have any other type of job or work for another 
employer than the one authorized in the work permit (FARADAY, 2012). Since 2014, due to changes in the 
legislation, domestic workers are able to opt to live out. Second and most important, after working for two 
years (or 3,900 hours) as a full time domestic worker within a period of four years from the time of arrival, 
the worker can apply for a permanent residence visa. The combination of these peculiarities can make a 
worker reticent in reporting abuses by the employer (FUDGE, 2011; MARINCOLA, 2011; HODGE, 2006). 
The worker may fear that filing a complaint against the employer could lead to termination and, as a result, 
prevent the worker from acquiring permanent resident status.10
Under these circumstances, the domestic worker may accept working in conditions not specified in 
the contract, e.g., longer working hours, fewer or no rest, and performing tasks that are not part of their 
duties in the original contract (OXMAN-MARTINEZ; HANLEY; CHEUNG, 2004). As there is no effective 
labour inspection, domestic workers facing a violation of their rights can only file a claim to the Minister of 
Labour or go to the courts. Informal domestic workers (full- or part-time) are often even more vulnerable, 
since they have no written contract and no social protection. 
Domestic workers have almost no union representation (ARAT-KOC, 1989) and cannot get any help 
in reporting abuse. They have no legal protection to exercise their freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights, being excluded from labour relations regulations in most provinces – for example, the 
Ontario Labour Relations Act – OLRA (Section 3. “This Act does not apply, (a) to a domestic employed in 
a private home”). 
Canada has not yet ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 189, but has already been the subject of a 
complaint before the ILO’s Committee of Freedom of Association for denying domestic workers’ freedom 
of association rights by excluding them from protection under Section 3a of the OLRA. The Canadian 
government has stated that certain categories of workers are legitimately excluded from the Act, because 
the statutory regime is not appropriate for non-industrial workplaces. The ILO has asked for creativity in 
finding new legal solutions to guarantee freedom of association to domestic workers (ILO, 2010). 
Taking the case of Ontario, the OLRA system is based on the organization of a bargain unit by a trade 
union freely constituted. The system also has its version of exclusivity of representation in the bargaining 
unit, but different from the Brazilian corporatist system, the exclusivity is achieved by a certification vote 
among the workers in that bargaining unit. Before the certification vote, the trade union must according to 
the OLRA proves that “40 percent or more of the individuals in the bargaining unit proposed” by the union 
“appear to be members of the union at the time the application was filed” through signed membership cards 
(OLRA, Section 8(2)). Only after the trade union complies with this rule, the Labour Board authorizes a 
certification vote. In the certification vote, the trade union must receive more than 50% of the votes. On one 
hand, this system confers much more representativeness to the certified trade union than the first-come, 
first-serve Brazilian rule concerning the unicity. We are not ignoring the hardship that trade unions face to 
organize a workplace and even to get to the point of having a certification vote, but just emphasizing that the 
workers’ participation in the certification of the trade union is a way to ensure the representativeness of that 
trade union. On the other, the OLRA poses three main obstacles to the unionization of domestic workers: 
10  Even though they can change employers, there is still the fear that this interruption might hurt the permanent resident visa application.
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the concept of an appropriate bargaining unit, the need to provide membership support and go through a 
certification vote and the lack of employers’ associations.
An appropriate bargaining unit should cover more than one worker, avoid the fragmentation of the 
representation and provide that workers share a community of interest.11 Domestic work is performed in 
a fragmented way. As we have said before, domestic workers work isolated from each other for different 
employers. Unless we accept a bargaining unit of one employee, which does not make sense in terms of 
collective organization, there is a need to make this fragmentation compatible with the idea a bargaining 
unit. One suggestion would be to include in the possibilities for a bargaining unit for domestic workers a 
geographical dimension and to disregard the multiplicity of employers. In this way, it would be possible to 
have a bargaining unit of private households in a city or province.
The need to provide membership support and go through a certification vote adds another challenge 
to domestic workers’ trade unions due to the fact that these workers work each of them to different employers 
in a private household. If for a traditional trade union, it is hard to access information on the workforce of a 
factory, it is much harder for a domestic workers’ trade union to find the domestic workers and to establish 
contact with them. The linkage between domestic work and migrant work in Canada gives a specific feature 
to this problem. On one hand, the fact that in Canada the majority of formal domestic workers are migrant 
workers on the LCP might facilitate the access of trade unions to domestic workers through migrant workers’ 
associations, such as the Filipino Migrant Workers Movement.12 On the other hand, most of these workers 
do not have domestic work as their career. They are professionals, who had a career back home and are 
in the domestic work in a temporary basis, aiming to become a permanent resident in Canada. Even in 
those cases, where the worker is not able to transition to another type of work after becoming a resident, 
the worker might not identify himself/herself as a domestic worker in a way to decide to organize or join a 
domestic workers trade union. Thus, there are structural and ideological obstacles to gather the necessary 
support to be certified as the exclusive trade union for the workers in a certain bargaining unity.
For a brief period (from 1993 to 1995) domestic workers were included in the OLRA. Fudge (1997) 
has analyzed the political and ideological motivations of this. The author concludes that the mere formal 
inclusion of domestic workers in labour law regulations not adapted to this type of work renders it ineffective. 
Borowy and Fudge (1993) raise a number of possibilities on how the Ontario Labour Relations Act could 
be changed to accommodate the rights of domestic workers. The authors argue that the labour relations 
model would have to move to a broader bargaining unit and emphasize the need for a central registry of 
domestic workers.
In addition to that, since it makes no sense to have collective bargaining with individual employers, in 
the case of domestic workers, it is necessary to have domestic workers’ employers’ associations in order to 
participate in collective bargaining. There are still no such associations. However, if we look at the example 
of other countries where domestic workers are involved in collective bargaining, we will find interesting 
alternatives to solve this problem. In Uruguay, since 2008 the Liga de Amas de Casa, Consumidores y 
Usuarios de la República Oriental del Uruguay has been representing domestic workers’ employers by 
invitation of the Ministry of Labour and participating in tripartite wage councils (GOLDSMITH, 2013, p. 9).13
Finally, we should consider the question posed by Langille (2009), but also addressed by Blackett 
and Sheppard (2003): “is there a rational reason why certain people are excluded from the statutory regime 
that instantiates a fundamental freedom open to others?” Following the ILO’s advice, this paper suggests 
that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)’s decision that expanded the meaning of Section 2(d) of the 
11 According to the OLRA Section 1(1), a bargaining unit is “a unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining, whether it is an employer unit 
or a plant unit or a subdivision of either of them”. 
12 A similar experience happens in Switzerland, where many domestic workers are migrant workers. See Alleva and Moretto (2011). 
13 See also the experience of collective bargaining models for domestic workers in France, Germany, Switzerland and Uruguay (ALLEVA; MORETTO, 
2011; ILO, 2011).
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms14 to recognize the freedom to engage in collective bargaining as part of the 
right to freedom of association (BOGG; EWING, 2012) may reverberate to the case of domestic workers. 
In Dunmore case, 2001, the SCC ruled that the exclusion of agricultural workers from the Ontario Labour 
Relations Act violated the Charter, requiring the government to pass a law that would protect their FA/CB 
rights. This study suggests that the exclusion of domestic workers from Canadian standard labour relations 
laws violates the Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Considering the Dunmore decision, 
we argue that the case of domestic workers and agricultural workers are similar such that it is reasonable 
to argue that domestic workers’ FA/CB fundamental rights are also being violated. The SCC found that 
the exclusion of agricultural workers from the protection of the OLRA violated Section 2(d) of the Charter 
(Dunmore v. Ontario 2001). Dunmore was the first of the three cases (the other two are: Health Services 
and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. B.C.2007 and Ontario v. Fraser 2011) that 
have redefined the meaning of section 2(d) of the Charter, including the right to collective bargaining under 
the right to freedom of association. 
In Dunmore, the SCC ruled that Section 2(d) of the Charter includes, among other collective activities, 
the freedom of workers to make collective representations to their employers. In excluding agricultural 
workers from the legal protection granted to all other workers in the Ontario Labour Relations Act, the 
Ontario government prevented these workers from exercising this freedom, and hence, violated the Charter. 
In B.C. Health Services, the SCC ruled that the Section 2(d) of the Charter includes a right to collective 
bargaining. In that case, the SCC decided that a British Colombia law that restricted collective bargaining 
and collective agreements of health workers violated their collective bargaining right and, therefore, Section 
2(d) of the Charter (ETHERINGTON, 2009). Ontario. In Fraser the SCC addressed the compatibility of the 
Ontario Agricultural Employees Protection Act 2002 (AEPA) with the collective bargaining right protected by 
Section 2(d) of the Charter. Even though the AEPA did not impose a duty to bargain in good faith, the SCC 
ruled that it was consistent with Section 2(d), based on the argument that it was not clear that the APEA 
would prevent agricultural workers from exercising their right to collective bargaining. 
Considering the reasoning developed by the SCC in these three decisions and court of appeals’ 
decision on the matter, this paper suggest that domestic workers’ exclusion violates Section 2(d) of the 
Charter since the exclusion of domestic workers from the protection of the Ontario Labour Relations Act 
substantially interferes, as the SCC ruling stated on Dunmore 2011, with the right of domestic workers to 
collective bargaining. 
The exclusion of domestic workers by the Ontario Labour Relations Act is a disproportional measure 
in accordance with Section 1 of the Charter. Following a two-step proportionality test, the exclusion does 
not seem to be justified by a “pressing and substantial concern”. Among the possible concerns, the common 
argument that the Wagner Act model used by the OLRA does not fit the peculiarities of domestic work cannot 
be considered a “pressing and substantial concern”, but a technical regulatory difficulty. The exclusion of 
domestic worker does not constitute an adequate and necessary measure to address this concern. (R. V. 
OAKS, 1993; ALEXY; RIVERS, 2010). Furthermore, the SCC ruling establishes that the right to collective 
bargaining is not restricted to any given model of labour relations (B.C. HEALTH SERVICES; BLACKETT, 
2009). 
5 Conclusion
There have been some important legal developments concerning the recognition of FA/CB to domestic 
workers in the case of Brazil and Canada. These two countries have very different labour relations systems. 
While Canada’s labour relations system is based on the Wagner Act model, Brazil’s system is characterized 
14 Section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: “2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: …(d) freedom of association”.
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by its corporatist structure that legally guarantees to one trade union the representation of a professional 
category.15 On both cases, labour law does not fit entirely in the peculiarities of domestic work and, as 
a result, domestic workers are excluded from labour law’s coverage, as it happens in most provinces in 
Canada, or face obstacles to have their FA/CB rights enforced, as it is the case in Brazil.
Address the role of law in promoting domestic workers’ rights, more specifically FA/CB rights, is 
essential to oppose the idea that the peculiarities of domestic work, and not the absence of legal protection, 
are the factors that substantially interfere with the right to collective bargaining (FARADAY, 2012). Moreover, 
the exclusion of domestic workers from labour law regulations violates the principle of freedom of association.
For policy purposes, the case of domestic work unites many characteristics that can serve other 
groups of vulnerable workers, such as migrants, low wage service workers, informal workers. As the ILO 
points out, workers in the informal economy are the ones who experience the greatest decent work deficits, 
including lack of representation and voice at work and lack of participation in channels of social dialogue 
(D’SOUZA, 2010; ILO, 2002). The fight against the vulnerability and precariousness of atypical workers’ 
demands creative solutions concerning their collective organization and bargaining. The case of domestic 
workers leads the way in showing what these solutions might be.
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